

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

2 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 2 June 1969

Noting the Director's request of 30 May for data pertaining to the agenda of the upcoming world Communist Party conference, ADD/I provided the Director with a [redacted] draft agenda (Secret). He noted that Peter Grose did a piece on the conference and reflected that he probably had access to the draft agenda. Goodwin commented that he has not briefed Grose or others on this matter.

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Godfrey reported that the situation in Argentina is growing considerably worse, with martial law declared in three cities. He noted that labor unions are aggravating grievances initially identified by students and that the future will provide new opportunities for the Peronist underground.

*Godfrey commented that the situation in Curacao came as a complete surprise. He mentioned that the wages of oil workers are relatively good and that there is little he can add [redacted]

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X1

Godfrey highlighted the results of the first-round balloting in France. He noted that the outcome of the elections is a toss-up but that, if pressed, it appears that Pompidou can be expected to win.

Godfrey noted receipt of a report indicating that Colonel Schramme has parachuted troops into the Congo. Godfrey went on to doubt the validity of the report.

The Director concurred in Godfrey's suggestion that a recently completed memorandum, Japan's Okinawa Policy, be given normal distribution.

Carver called attention to the cabled request for the Director's concurrence or comment on Ambassador Bunker's suggestion that

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COS, Saigon see Congressman John Conyers. After some discussion the Director asked the DD/P to draft a cable for his signature concurring in Ambassador Bunker's scenario for the meeting [redacted] 25X

Carver noted that the station forecasted increased VC activity on or about 1 June and again on 1 July.

Maury noted that OSI is scheduled to brief Senator Baker at 9 a. m. on 4 June.

Maury noted receipt of a call advising that Roland Paul and Walter Pincus of the staff of the Symington Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be visiting the Far East in July and have asked to come to the Agency for a briefing. The Director concurred.

Maury noted that the Director's appearance before the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has been postponed indefinitely.

Maury called attention to the article in the Sunday Washington Post on Congressman Riegle's aspirations for the Presidency.

X1 Warner for Houston reported that the judge threw out the [redacted] 25X
[redacted] case with the comment that "fiction has its place in novels but not in a court of law."

X1 DD/P recalled the Director's question on Souvanna Phouma's reported meeting with a Soviet desk officer and noted that this matter has been considerably clarified through the issuance of [redacted] 25X
[redacted] on the Prime Minister's plans to use British, Soviet, and U. S. influence in solving the Laos problem.

X1 Executive Director noted that [redacted] is scheduled to complete his study on [redacted] today. He commented that a coordinated draft letter to Under Secretary Packard is in hand and suggested that the Director consider the draft in the course of a briefing. The Director asked the Executive Director to schedule a briefing and requested that General Cushman also be present. 25X

DDCI noted that no difficulties were encountered over the weekend with respect to John Finney's article in the Sunday New York Times.

The Director recalled he had suggested that USIB meet this week. After some discussion items identified for inclusion on the agenda were

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The Director favorably noted the Ben Welles article in today's New York Times.

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L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

The Pay Is Low but Motivation Is High Among C.I.A. Recruits

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 1 — The average recruit for the Central Intelligence Agency these days is likely to be around 26 years old, with an M.A. — and probably a Ph.D. — degree, command of at least one foreign language and "motivation."

"We're not interested in the man who just wants to make money," said one qualified informant recently. "What really counts is motivation."

This de-emphasis on salaries is, perhaps, just as well, informants say, for the starting wage for young officers in the nation's secret intelligence organization is comparable to starting Government salaries in less exotic work, around \$8,000.

With diligence, ability and luck, however, the American secret agent can aspire to the salary of the agency's director Richard Helms, which Congress recently raised to \$42,500 from \$30,000. Mr. Helms is not only head of the C.I.A. he is also the President's personal intelligence adviser and the coordinator of all Government intelligence activities.

He presides, for instance, each Thursday over the meetings of representatives of the national intelligence community — the C.I.A., the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has, in addition, virtually instantaneous access to President Nixon.

'Trickle' of Recruits

The C.I.A.'s emphasis on motivation may largely account, informants say, for the fact that the agency accepts each year only a carefully screened "trickle" of recruits — men and women, single or married. The number of employees and the agency's yearly operating budget are closely guarded secrets, as is the number of recruits added each spring as the university year draws to a close. However, published figures of 15,000 employees at home and abroad and \$500-million expended annually have not been seriously challenged by those who know.

"We recruit about one out of every 10 applicants," said an informant. "Each takes about 10 tests — general and specialized knowledge, physical and mental aptitudes, psychological and so forth. There's nothing ugly about the tests; they're thorough but routine. Some applicants drop out along the way and others are screened out."

Recruiting for the agency has been conducted openly through about 200 university and college placement offices across the nation for the last 10 years, informants say.

In the last two years, however, as student feeling has mounted against the Vietnam war, the so-called military-industrial complex and the Establishment in general, the C.I.A. has adopted a deliberately low recruiting silhouette.

"We still arrange interviews with applicants on college campuses," one source explained, "unless we get word that the local S.D.S. chapter or some other militant group plans to demonstrate."

When campus disorders loom, he added, applicants are interviewed at C.I.A. offices (listed in local telephone books) in the Federal office buildings in the nation's major cities, or at a local recruiting office at Arlington, Va., near the agency's headquarters building.

Energy Commission between them, he added, probably lead the government in the use of computers and data retrieval procedures.

'Dirty Tricks'

By contrast, other sources say, the clandestine work or "dirty tricks" side as it is called inside the agency, plays far less a role than is popularly supposed.

"Every covert action, for instance, must first be authorized by a top-level White House committee consisting of the President's adviser on national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard and Dick Helms himself," an informant emphasized. "If there's any disagreement, the President makes the final decision."

"Moreover," he added, "James Bond to the contrary, absolutely no one is authorized,

licensed, permitted or encouraged to kill anyone."

Since the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, knowledgeable sources stress, complete disclosure of the agency's activities, plans, personnel and budget is also made regularly to a small, hand-picked group of key Senators and Representatives who serve as Congress's "watchdog."

Not only has there never been a security leak, informants say, but the presence of the "watchdog" committee has also insulated the agency from Congressional pressures.

Those familiar with C.I.A. operations assert that the agency has never been penetrated, unlike its principal rival, the Soviet Union's K.G.B., several of whose officers have defected to the West. C.I.A. security procedures, sources say, are ultratight.

There are four major C.I.A. operating areas: covert operations, known colloquially as "dirty tricks"; intelligence col-

lection and evaluation; science and technology, and "support," or administration.

In "covert operations"—sabotage, kidnapping, elimination of enemies, the infiltration of "illegal" espionage agents—some qualified sources believe that the Soviet Union has an edge. But experts here believe that the United States is far ahead of the Soviet Union and other Communist states in its methodical collection and analysis of global intelligence.

The Silent Summons

Specialists also believe that the C.I.A. excels its rivals in science and technology and in administration. The latter includes recruiting, training, communications, security, funds, medical attention—and retirement arrangements.

"The C.I.A., for instance, advertises in technical journals for qualified scientists," said an informant. "The facilities are small but excellent and young

scientists often like to work with older men they respect. Lots of the work consists of miniaturization—like tiny radio transmitters that allow an agent to transmit fast, then get off the air before he's detected."

The agency's emphasis on miniaturization has also benefited from scientific "fallout" from the space program. One of the most intriguing — and nonsecret — devices recently produced is a small gadget, the size of a match box, carried in a pocket. It vibrates soundlessly when the bearer is wanted by his colleagues on the telephone. He then calls his office.

"It works on the same principle as the beeper that doctors use when they're wandering around hospitals, only it's silent," said one source. "It would be embarrassing, for instance, for a top C.I.A. official in church or at a party if he suddenly began beeping."

Impact of Disclosure

Qualified sources recalled that public disclosure in 1967 of secret C.I.A. funding of the international activity of American students, labor and cultural activities had led to an order by President Johnson to cease such funding by Dec. 31, 1967.

"Funds were already being whittled down anyway and the cutoff has had very little impact on the agency's work," one source said.

While the agency still maintains a heavy curtain of secrecy over its activities, Mr. Helms, a onetime newspaperman, has in recent months authorized a policy of dispelling the public impression that it is an "invisible government": toppling unfriendly foreign Governments, eliminating hostile foreign leaders, a law unto itself.

Recently, for instance, on Mr. Helms's public recommendation, Col. Lawrence K. White, third-ranking official of the C.I.A., was selected as one of 10 officials to receive the 1969 National Civil Service League Award for outstanding public service.

Colonel White, a friendly, soft-spoken hero of World War II who joined the agency in 1947 after being invalided from the Army for combat wounds, was described by Mr. Helms in a letter to Mortimer M. Caplin, former Commissioner of Internal Revenue and now president of the National Civil Service League, as "the principal architect of the agency's management structure [who] having designed it . . . built it."

"No man of C.I.A.," Mr. Helms wrote, "has made a greater or what will be a more lasting contribution."

The bulk of the agency's work consists of gathering intelligence from radio broadcasts, from agents and other sources all over the world and then evaluating it for the President. One officer said, "We have enough intellectuals and specialists to staff a medium-sized college faculty."

Michigan Congressman Aims High

Donald Riegler Wants to Be President in About 15 Years

By Richard L. Lyons
Washington Post Staff Writer

Rep. Donald W. Riegler Jr. (R-Mich.) is an intense young man who, if everything goes his way, will be running for President of the United States in about 15 years.

He sees it as the only logical goal of a man in public life who is "interested in this problem-solving business and wants to change things for the better. That's where the power is to make things happen," he said, in an interview. He'd like to have his crack at the Presidency in time to go on to a career as a college president before his mid-50s.

Riegler has a way to go. He is 31 and a second-term Congressman, but so far everything has come up roses during his three-year political career.

Jaycee Choice

In 1966, Riegler broke off work on his doctoral degree at Harvard Business School to win a House seat in the Democratic stronghold of Flint, which Michigan Republicans assumed was a lost cause.

In Washington, he became the youngest freshman ever to win a seat on the Appropriations Committee where he went on the foreign aid subcommittee and specialized in Vietnam. After one year in the House, he was selected as one of the Nation's 10 most outstanding young men by the Junior Chamber of Commerce and one of the two best Congressmen by the left-leaning magazine Nation.

Feels Confined

Riegler talks a lot about the Kennedys as the standard for measuring his own performance. He and John F. Kennedy (as well as Lyndon B. Johnson) went to the House at 28. In his brief moments of leisure, Riegler says he likes to play touch football. He is lanky with an unruly forelock. He set out to build the best staff in Con-



REP. DONALD RIEGLER
... man in a hurry

gress, setting the Kennedys' operations as a standard, and says he has as good a staff as any at the Capitol.

Like many hard-driving young men who want to change the world, Riegler feels unduly confined in the House, which runs on seniority and slowly. "Most things a junior House member accomplishes are done by going around the system or in spite of it."

"The Senate is a better forum to present ideas," said Riegler. "A Senator has more staff and there is more opportunity to tackle a number of problems."

'Play to Win'

So Riegler is considering trying for Democratic Senator Philip Hart's seat next year, "but only if I'm convinced I have a fighting chance." Having decided public life is the place to get things done, he doesn't want to end it all after four years in a hopeless race.

Riegler, who worked three years at International Business Machines, approaches his career as he does issues—in a scientific, computerized way. But he needs money and party support and a favorable political climate. His headlong pace has not made him universally

beloved among his political brethren.

Riegler looks at it all this way: "You're here a short enough time. If you're not willing to play to win, to do something worthwhile, why play at all?"

'Flip Charts'

"For three years (in his mid-20s) I worked to become president of IBM, but then I thought I couldn't achieve enough there. If you think of it in terms of how can you be more effective, how can you have more power to change things for the better, then the Senate is more desirable than the House, the Cabinet is probably more desirable than the Senate and the Presidency is the most desirable of all."

A prominent feature of Riegler's office is a large easel bearing a big pad of paper—"flip charts"—where Riegler and his staff spend a lot of time breaking down issues into component parts and putting them back together.

Vietnam Notebook

His top staffers are Carl Blake, with whom Riegler worked at IBM, and Dave Brunell, a former assistant dean at the Harvard Business School who came to Washington with Riegler. Riegler said teachers and IBM people do a lot of their thinking writing on blackboards and making orderly presentations on flip charts.

Riegler has made Vietnam his specialty and was one of

the first House members to call for staged withdrawal of American troops.

Riegler has been to Vietnam once, and he and his staff have made an exhaustive study of the war, breaking it into about 20 component parts and studying the pieces.

Riegler held up a thick black notebook and said: "I think there is as much relevant information compiled here on Vietnam during the last 2½ years as there probably is anywhere in the Capitol." One small part is a line-by-line analysis of 60 Vietnam speeches by President Johnson, undertaken to show shifts in Administration position on the war.

Riegler's staff is set up the same scientific way, designed to get the most done in the least time. He has a manual describing each staff job so if one person leaves someone else can move right in. He has a hotline to his district office in Flint so any constituent can phone his Congressman free. He compares his office to a professional football team with everyone dependent on each other and he, the quarterback, no better than the line makes him.

'Too Serious'

"The senior members sometimes kid me as too serious," said Riegler, who was at work while most of his colleagues were taking a long weekend off or had flown off to the Paris Air Show.

"We laugh a lot around here, but this is an extremely serious job to us, and we do it as well as we possibly can. We're here to try to make a difference, not 20 years from now, but now. If I didn't think I could make an impact I would go somewhere else. I want to be on the firing line to make things better."

As for the Presidency, well, Riegler comes from a big state. "But if I ever make it through this maze, it will have to be through hard work, wits, making the right decision before the other guy, and luck."

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

and Jack Anderson

Two Foundations

This column was in error last week in implying that the traditional separation between the Peace Corps and the CIA was being relaxed.

The inference was based principally on the fact that ACCION, founded by the new head of the Peace Corps, Joe Blatchford, in South America had received \$50,000 from the Donner Foundation, a reported CIA conduit. We now find that there are two Donner Foundations and that the William H. Donner Foundation, which contributed to ACCION, has never been a CIA conduit.

We regret the error and further state that we are convinced the Peace Corps has no connection, direct or indirect, with the CIA.

As we have noted in the past, the Peace Corps has done an outstanding job of bringing the idealism of young Americans to many foreign countries. It was one of the finest projects initiated by President Kennedy and we feel sure it will continue so under its new administrator.

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mailing offices.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1969

Nixon Critics Say Intelligence Gap Clouds ABM Issue

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 31

Boiling beneath the surface of the missile defense debate in the Senate are charges by critics of the Administration that the Pentagon is exaggerating the Soviet threat by distorting intelligence estimates.

These charges center on apparent discrepancies between the national intelligence estimates, prepared under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the far grimmer projections of the Soviet military potential offered by the Pentagon in defense of the proposed Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

As seen by ABM critics, this "intelligence gap," goes to the heart of the argument over whether there is a military necessity to start immediate deployment of the Safeguard system.

The Underlying Premise

The underlying premise of the Pentagon's case for the Safeguard deployment around Minuteman missile bases is that the Soviet build-up in offensive military strength threatens to erode American retaliatory capacity by the mid-1970's. In support of this contention, the Defense Department has offered projections showing that by 1975, the Soviet Union will have a missile force capable of knocking out 90 per cent or more of the 1,000-missile Minuteman force.

But some leading ABM opponents in the Senate, who have had access to the Pentagon testimony as well as to secret briefings by the C.I.A., are insisting that the Pentagon projections of Soviet strike capability are not supported by the estimates agreed upon within the intelligence community.

According to these Senators, the following inconsistencies have developed between the Pentagon assessments and the estimates of the intelligence community:

¶The Defense Department projects that by 1975, the Soviet Union will have 500 SS-9 missiles, each carrying three independently targetable, highly accurate warheads. The C.I.A. reportedly questions that the current SS-9 deployment rate will be continued to 1975.

¶Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has contended that Pentagon projections of Soviet SS-9 strength were based on "new evidence," not available to the Johnson Administration. In secret briefings, the C.I.A. has reportedly said it has no new intelligence information justifying Mr. Laird's extrapolation of SS-9 as a "first-strike weapon," developed by the Soviet Union to eliminate American retaliatory capability. No such judgment has reportedly been reached by the intelligence community.

¶Mr. Laird has tended to describe the Soviet ABM system

around Moscow as a continuing, potentially effective project for which a second generation of missiles was being developed. But intelligence experts have reportedly come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has halted construction of the system after completing about 70 of the 120 planned missile sites.

The Defense Department has insisted that its projections are based on estimates agreed upon by the intelligence community. Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of Defense Research and Engineering, asserted in a speech May 12 that "Mr. Laird's statements are based upon agreed intelligence data."

This assertion has been disputed by some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has had several secret briefings by the C. I. A. in recent weeks.

These divergencies may be explained at least in part by the varying methods by which intelligence estimates are prepared and interpreted.

All estimates begin with the so-called "national intelligence estimates," prepared by an interagency committee. It is composed of representatives of the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the State Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. These statistics only attempt to project Soviet developments up to a

Beyond the national intelligence estimates, the intelligence

community prepares "national intelligence projections for planning purposes" once a year. These attempt to project Soviet developments 10 years into the future. As intelligence officials acknowledge, uncertainties inevitably are a part of such long-range projections, because they are based more on assumptions than on concrete intelligence information.

'Worst Possible' Developments

Then, for its planning purposes, the Defense Department also prepares its own estimates in which it attempts to anticipate all the "worst possible" developments and comes up with its estimates of a "greater-than-expected threat."

In a debate over an issue such as ABM deployment, however, these estimates tend to be used interchangeably by military advocates, who may employ the upper range, or even a footnote, in an admittedly hypothetical projection in order to justify some decision, which is then claimed to be based on intelligence estimates.

That is basically what happened in the "bomber gap" issue in the 1956 Presidential campaign and in the "missile gap" issue of 1960—both of which were projected in some intelligence estimates, but neither of which materialized in fact.

As the Senate ABM debate the Safeguard system believe the "intelligence gap" could be

one of their most telling arguments. But they are somewhat inhibited by security and personalities in making the argument publicly.

Because the intelligence information was presented to them by the C.I.A. under the strictest secrecy provisions, the Senators are not willing to discuss the information publicly.

Furthermore, they fear that if they do so and suggest their anti-Administration information was obtained from the C.I.A., they could jeopardize the career of Richard Helms, the director

of Central Intelligence. This they are reluctant to do, for as one senior committee member, long a critic of the C.I.A., put it: "Helms is the only one under present conditions who tells it as he sees it."

But indignation over Mr. Laird's "selective declassification" is now reaching the point where some ABM opponents are prepared to publicly challenge his intelligence estimates by referring, at least obliquely, to the contradictory information they have received from the Central Intelligence Agency.

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28 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 28 May 1969

ADD/I received the Director's concurrence to provide General Carroll with a copy of the recently completed memorandum on ICBM deployment together with a request that General Carroll coordinate and express his views on the paper. ADD/I raised the possibility of providing General Maxwell Taylor with a copy of the same memorandum, and the Director indicated that this should not be done at this time.



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Godfrey called attention to reports suggesting that the situation in Haiti may cause Duvalier to arise from his sickbed and take repressive measures.

Carver noted that NSSM No. 36, Vietnamizing the War, contains no problems with respect to the intelligence contained therein but that we are not voting on the recommendations. He noted that the paper will go to JCS members today.

Maury noted that an appointment has been made with Senator Howard Baker in response to his inquiry on /Soviet/ controls over thermonuclear reaction.

Maury advised that the only report thus far regarding the Director's appearance before the Rivers Committee is from Frank Slatinsheck, who felt that the session went extremely well but observed that congressmen took a disproportionate amount of the time allotted.

Maury reported that Frank Slatinsheck has requested comparative dollar figures with respect to the Agency's budget vs. other elements

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of the intelligence community. The Director asked that Slatinsheck be advised to get these figures from Bob Michaels in order to avoid any possible problem with Congressman Mahon.



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The Director briefed on EA/DCI and Carver's luncheon meeting yesterday with William Baroody, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

The Director pointed to his and D/ONE's upcoming visit with Dr. Kissinger this morning. A lengthy discussion followed on the relevance of the NIPP and Estimates to someone who wishes to argue that the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability.

Goodwin noted receipt of a request from Nina Kauffman for the Director to appear on the Betty Groebli Show. The request was turned down.



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for L. K. White

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